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Abstract
The wide variety of services and resources available over the Internet presents
new opportunities to create value added, inter-organisational Composite Services
(CSs) from multiple existing services. The resulting CS can involve close inter-
action among the constituent services of participating organisations. To preserve
their autonomy and privacy, each organisation needs to regulate access both to their
services and to shared information within the CS. Key mechanisms to facilitate
such regulated interactions are the collection and verification of non-repudiable ev-
idence of the actions of the parties to the CS. The paper describes how component
based middleware can be enhanced to support non-repudiable service invocation
and information sharing. These mechanisms may be incorporated in the service
delivery platforms at each organisation or at one or more trusted third parties who
offer non-repudiation services, or some combination of these options. A generic
implementation, based on a J2EE application server, is presented.
Keywords: System Security; FT Architecture/Middleware Software Engineering;
Non-repudiation; Service Composition
1 Introduction
The wide variety of services and resources available over the Internet presents new op-
portunities to create value-added, inter-organisational Composite Services (CSs) from
multiple existing services. The resulting CS can involve close interaction among the
constituent services of participating organisations. Nevertheless, each organisation
needs to maintain their autonomy and privacy. This implies the regulation of access
both to the services offered within a CS and to information that is shared in a CS.
Regulation of access to shared information includes validation by all interested par-
ties of any proposed changes to that information. Since the intention is to compose
a CS from existing services, regulatory requirements should be met by the extension,
as opposed to replacement, of existing services. The main contribution of this paper
is to address this requirement by extending component based middleware to provide a
flexible framework to support regulated interaction between organisations.
It is assumed that each organisation has a local set of policies for an interaction that
is consistent with an overall agreement (or set of agreements) between organisations
(the business contract). The formation and operation of the CS must not compromise
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local policies and must comply with the business contract. There are two aspects to
regulation in this context:
1. high level mechanisms to specify and enforce contractual rights and obligations
(examples include work on Law Governed Interaction [15] and on contract rep-
resentation and monitoring [16]); and
2. lower level mechanisms to generate a non-repudiable audit trail that can be used
to record and to verify that observed interaction behaviour adheres to agree-
ments.
An interaction is non-repudiable if it is impossible for any party to the interaction
to subsequently deny their participation. This paper presents two mechanisms that
together form the basic building blocks for trusted interaction: non-repudiable service
invocation and non-repudiable information sharing. These provide abstractions that
are familiar from the intra-organisational context and result in regulated interaction
in the inter-organisational context. For example, non-repudiable service invocation
can be used to audit requests between organisations to access or modify each other’s
internal information, or for transfer of control over shared information. Non-repudiable
information sharing regulates access to and updates of shared information.
The contributions of this paper are that it: (i) introduces the abstraction of trusted
interceptors that mediate the interaction between organisations to achieve the exchange
of non-repudiation evidence and to validate changes to shared information; (ii) shows
that this abstraction is sufficiently general to apply to a variety of interaction scenarios;
and (iii) demonstrates the practicality of the abstraction through a prototype imple-
mentation in component based middleware (such as J2EE [21]). Section 2 provides
a motivating example. Section 3 discusses the trusted interceptor abstraction and our
model of non-repudiable interaction. Section 4 describes the prototype component-
based implementation of non-repudiation services. Related work is discussed in Sec-
tion 5. Section 6 concludes the paper with an overview of future work.
2 Motivating example
This section describes the scenario of a specialist car manufacturer that combines com-
ponents from various part suppliers to satisfy the requirements of a specialist car dealer
(acting on behalf of the ultimate customer). Figure 1 presents the overall structure of
the interaction between the specialist car dealer, the car manufacturer and, in this ex-
ample, three car part suppliers. In effect these enterprises collaborate to form a virtual
enterprise (VE) to deliver a specialist car to the car dealer’s customer. That is, the
VE creates a Composite Service (CS) for the specification and delivery of a specialist
car. The CS interactions must be regulated to ensure that each member of the VE ob-
tains the value they expect from the collaboration and are bound to the corresponding
commitments they make.
CS interactions involve invocation of services between members of the VE and the
sharing of information that is held in common by the VE. For example, Figure 1 depicts
the car manufacturer and suppliers A and B negotiating the delivery of some compo-
nent. The component is required to meet an overall specification negotiated between
the dealer and the manufacturer. The manufacturer is then required to reach agreement
with the suppliers on details such as: interfaces between parts, cost of customisation
and delivery schedules. It is natural to share this information so that each party can
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Figure 1: Specialist car manufacturer application
update it (subject to the agreement of the other parties). Other artifacts that are shared,
and may be subject to renegotiation, are the agreements governing the interaction. In
addition to update to shared information, the process of reaching agreement on the
specification of a car component, and the car as a whole, will involve requests between
parties that some action is performed. Actions may range from the resolution of queries
on the range of parts available to requests to act on shared information (initiating a
transfer of control). These requests are naturally expressed as service invocations.
To regulate interactions of the above type, a given action must be attributable to
the party who performed the action and commitments made must be attributable to the
committing party. For example, it should not be possible for a client to subsequently
disavow the request and consumption of a service. Similarly, it should not be possible
for the service provider to subsequently deny having delivered a service. If information
is shared then the parties sharing the information should be able to validate a proposed
update, the update should be attributable to its proposer and the validation decisions
with respect to the update attributable to the other parties. That is, to regulate an inter-
action we require attribution, validation and audit. Non-repudiable attribution binds an
action to the party performing the action. Validation determines the legality of an action
with respect to interaction agreements. Audit ensures that evidence is available in case
of dispute and to inform future interactions. This paper addresses these requirements
by providing two building blocks for regulated interaction between organisations: non-
repudiable service invocation (NR-Invocation) and non-repudiable information sharing
(NR-Sharing). Component middleware support for regulated service interactions en-
sures that actions of a member of a VE are non-repudiably bound to the member; the
acceptance, or otherwise, of those actions is non-repudiably bound to the other mem-
bers of the VE; and that service invocations, and the results of those invocations, are
bound to the parties to the invocation.
3 Building blocks for trusted interaction
This section discusses the abstraction of trusted interceptors that mediate inter-organis-
ational interaction and describes our model of non-repudiable interaction in terms of
this abstraction. We argue that the trusted interceptor abstraction is sufficiently general
to apply to a variety of interaction scenarios. For example, it is not bound to particular
non-repudiation protocols but can be seen as a flexible framework in which protocols
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can be deployed as appropriate to the regulatory regime governing an interaction or to
the trust relationships between the parties to an interaction.
3.1 Trusted interceptors and trust domains
Inter-organisational interaction requires regulatory mechanisms to ensure: (i) that mis-
behaviour by dishonest parties does not disadvantage honest parties and (ii) that honest
parties share a verifiable, consistent view of the nature of the interaction. However,
different types of interaction will demand different mechanisms. The choice of mech-
anisms to deploy will be determined by application-specific factors such as: the re-
lationship between the parties to the interaction, the legal framework and agreements
that govern the interaction, and the application domain within which the organisations
operate. The common feature of all regulatory mechanisms is that they somehow me-
diate the interaction between parties. The trusted interceptor abstraction generalises
this notion of mediation. As shown in Figure 2, conceptually, each party has a trusted
interceptor
Org. A Org. B
Org. C
trust
domain
interceptor
interceptor
Figure 2: Trusted interceptors
interceptor that acts on its behalf. The introduction of trusted interceptors transforms
an unregulated domain into a trust domain for the conduct of regulated, audited and
fair interaction. Informally, a fair interaction is one in which honest parties cannot be
disadvantaged by the behaviour of dishonest parties (for details, see Markowitch et al
[14] who discuss the evolution of the notion of fairness in exchange protocols). The
trusted interceptor abstraction insulates the parties to the interaction from the detail of
underlying mechanisms used to meet regulatory requirements. Interceptors can im-
plement different mechanisms to meet different interaction requirements and can be
reconfigured to meet changing requirements as relationships evolve.
Trusted interceptors provide a trust domain by policing access to the domain and
regulating and auditing actions within the domain. To support dispute resolution, the
fact that trusted interceptors mediated the interaction provides any honest party with
irrefutable evidence of their own actions within the domain and of the observed ac-
tions of other parties. The regulatory mechanisms used to support a trust domain will
vary according to the degree of trust between parties. For example, a more lightweight
mechanism can be used when parties, who otherwise trust each other, need a verifi-
able audit trail of their interaction compared to the situation where parties are mutually
mistrusting (and require strong fairness guarantees). Also, certain types of interaction
may be inherently more trustworthy than others. For example, there may be stronger
incentives to good behaviour in a long-running interaction involving update to shared
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information between members of a VE compared with a one-off service invocation.
This observation is supported by work on the Iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma [1] where
the prospect of and payoff from future interaction can even induce antagonists to coop-
erate. Ultimately, trusted interceptors construct a trust domain that, under assumptions
agreed between the parties to an interaction, delivers safety and liveness guarantees.
Safety guarantees ensure that the interaction complies with agreements between organ-
isations — for example, that changes to shared information are unanimously agreed.
Liveness guarantees address forward progress — for example, that honest parties can
resolve an exchange despite non-cooperation of dishonest parties.
(c) direct trust domain
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interceptor interceptor
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Figure 3: Trust domains using trusted interceptors
Figure 3 shows three approaches to the use of trusted interceptors to provide a trust
domain (for simplicity, between two organisations). In both Figure 3(a) and 3(b), com-
munication between organisations A and B is routed via Trusted Third Parties (TTP(s)).
Figure 3(a) shows a single TTP acting on behalf of both organisations. Figure 3(b) is
the construction of an inline TTP from TTPs acting on behalf of A and B. However
constructed, the inline TTP is an interceptor between the organisations and is respon-
sible for ensuring that agreed safety and liveness guarantees are delivered to honest
parties.
The alternative to interaction through inline TTPs is the formation of a direct trust
domain by the organisations themselves. As shown in Figure 3(c), in this case, each
party hosts its trusted interceptor. The interceptors execute protocols that deliver the
guarantees required to form a trust domain appropriate to the given interaction. De-
pending on the relationship between organisations and the specific interaction require-
ments, this direct trust domain may demand the availability of one or more TTPs.
These TTP(s) are not directly involved in all communication between the parties but
may be called upon to resolve or abort a protocol run to deliver fairness and/or live-
ness guarantees to honest parties. The organisations forming a trust domain can agree
on the deployment of different interceptors to deliver different fairness or reliability
guarantees or to satisfy different evidentiary requirements. An advantage of the for-
mation of a direct trust domain is that it is easier to make trade-offs between different
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requirements. For example, the implementation of non-repudiable information sharing
described in Section 4.3 involves direct interaction between organisations without the
support of a TTP. Nevertheless, as shown in [5], it has the safety property that an hon-
est party can irrefutably assert the validity of the (agreed) state of shared information
despite failure and/or misbehaviour by other parties. It has the liveness property that if
no party misbehaves, agreed interactions take place despite a bounded number of tem-
porary network and computer related failures. In effect, the risk of a loss of liveness
and the resultant breakdown of an interaction leading to dispute is traded against the
advantage of direct interaction between parties without the involvement of a TTP. An
alternative implementation, using different interceptors, could involve a TTP to deliver
a stronger liveness guarantee.
The above models for implementation of a trust domain are not mutually exclusive.
One part of an interaction may deploy interceptors at trusted third parties while another
uses interceptors hosted within each organisation. As an interaction evolves it may be
appropriate to change the deployment of interceptors.
In the remainder of this section we describe how trusted interceptors are used to
achieve regulated service invocation and information sharing. First, we enumerate the
trusted interceptor assumptions (some of which are trivially met when a single TTP
acts as interceptor for all parties):
1. Trusted interceptors use perfect cryptography. For example, signatures cannot
be forged and encrypted data cannot be decrypted except with the appropriate
decryption key.
2. The communication channel between trusted interceptors provides eventual mes-
sage delivery (there is a bounded number of temporary network and computer
related failures).
3. Trusted interceptors have persistent storage for messages (or, more precisely, ev-
idence extracted from messages). The minimum requirement is that interceptors
ensure evidence is available for as long as is necessary to meet their obligations
to the other interceptors mediating an interaction. Longer term storage to protect
the interests of the party on whose behalf an interceptor acts will be determined
by agreement between the party and its interceptor.
4. Trusted interceptors only exchange messages that are well constructed with re-
spect to the interaction they are mediating. For example: interceptors do not
relay information provided by the organisation they represent that is invalid with
respect to a given protocol execution; and messages exchanged are either tamper-
resistant (encrypted), or tampering is detectable and interceptors will cooperate
to ensure a well-constructed message is eventually delivered.
5. Trusted interceptors execute on reliable nodes or the interaction between them
is made fault tolerant by employing mechanisms such as those described by
Ezhilchelvan and Shrivastava [7].
Given these assumptions, trusted interceptors can cooperate to ensure fairness and live-
ness for honest parties to an interaction. Ultimately, since cooperation of dishonest
parties cannot be enforced, the guarantee is that trusted interceptors will support the
conclusion of dispute resolution in favour of honest parties. The infrastructure require-
ments implied by the above assumptions are discussed in Section 3.5.
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The following descriptions of non-repudiation services apply to all three approaches
to constructing a trust domain. In the case of a single inline TTP, trusted interceptors
acting on behalf of each party are co-located and communication between them is in-
ternal to the TTP. In practice, this may mean that the interceptors are constructed from
components hosted by the same application server and interfaces to interact through
the interceptors are presented to participating organisations.
3.2 Non-repudiable service invocation
Figure 4(a) shows a typical two-party, client-server interaction. The client invokes
(b) Non-repudiable service invocation
req, NROreq
resp, NROresp
NRRresp
req
resp
req
resp
NRRreq
interceptor interceptor
Client Server
(a) Service invocation
request
responseClient Server
Figure 4: Non-repudiable service invocation
a service by sending a request to the server who issues a response. We assume at-
most-once service invocation semantics (supported by most middleware): if the client
receives the response then this means that the invoked operation has been executed
once; if no response is received then the operation may or may not have been executed.
Non-repudiable service invocation provides the following additional assurances to the
client: (1) that following an attempt to submit a request to a server, either: (a) the
submission failed and the server did not receive the request; or (b) the submission
succeeded and there is proof that the request is available to the server; and: (2) that
if a response is received, there is proof that the server produced the response. For the
server, the corresponding assurances are: (1) that if a request is received, there is proof
identifying the client who submitted the request; and: (2) that following an attempt
to deliver a response to the client, either: (a) the delivery failed and the client did not
receive the response; or (b) delivery succeeded and there is proof that the response is
available to the client.
To provide the above assurances, trusted interceptors execute a non-repudiation
protocol that ensures the following:
1. a request is passed to a server if, and only if, the client (or its interceptor) provides
non-repudiation evidence of the origin of the request (NROreq) and the server
(or its interceptor) provides non-repudiation evidence of receipt of the request
(NRRreq)
2. the response is passed to the client if, and only if, the server (or its intercep-
tor) provides non-repudiation evidence of the origin of the result (NROresp) and
the client (or its interceptor) provides non-repudiation evidence of receipt of the
response (NRRresp).
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Non-repudiation tokens include a unique request identifier, to distinguish between pro-
tocol runs and to bind protocol steps to a run, and a signature on a secure hash of the
evidence generated. Figure 4(b) models the exchange of evidence achieved by the exe-
cution of an appropriate non-repudiation protocol between interceptors acting on behalf
of client and server. The client initiates a request for some service. The client’s inter-
ceptor generates an NROreq token and then sends both the request and the token to the
server’s interceptor. The server’s interceptor generates an NRRreq token and returns it
to the client’s interceptor. The server’s interceptor then passes the request to the server
to generate a response. On receipt of the response, the server’s interceptor generates
an NROresp token and sends both the response and the token to the client’s interceptor.
As noted in Section 3.1, the interceptors are responsible for verification and persis-
tence of evidence generated during the exchange. The exact meaning of generation of
non-repudiation evidence will be dependent on the actual protocol used to execute the
exchange. Client and server may sign evidence, or their interceptors may sign on their
behalf, or, as with some fair exchange protocols, a combination of client/server signing
in the normal case and TTP signing in case of recovery will be used. Minimally, the
interceptors ensure that irrefutable evidence of the exchange is generated.
Assuming the server-side response (resp) includes evidence as to whether the re-
quest was made available to the server, the above model of the interaction between
client interceptor and server interceptor can be simplified to:
client interceptor → server interceptor : req, NROreq
server interceptor → client interceptor : resp, NRRreq, NROresp
client interceptor → server interceptor : NRRresp
If the request was made available to the server, then resp is either the result of normal
execution of the request at the server or interceptor-generated evidence that the request
failed or that the server did not respond within some agreed timeout or that the client
initiated an abort of the request before a result was available. If the request was not
made available to the server, then resp indicates that the request was received but
not executed. Similarly, the client-side receipt for the server-side response, NRRresp,
may include evidence as to the client’s consumption of the response. For example, if
the interceptor can prevent access to the result of the server’s execution of the client’s
request, then the NRRresp can indicate that the response was received but not consumed
by the client. This equates to at-most-once semantics where a server may do work on
behalf of a client that is not consumed. Given these semantics, the client may fail or
timeout and the server will receive evidence that a result was generated that the client
did not consume.
3.3 Non-repudiable information sharing
Figure 5(a) shows three organisations (A, B and C) accessing and updating shared
information. If, for example, A wishes to update the information, then they must reach
agreement with B and C on the validity of the proposed update. For the agreement to be
non-repudiable: (i) B and C require evidence that the update originated at A; and (ii) A,
B and C require evidence that, after reaching a decision on the update, all parties have
a consistent view of the agreed state of the shared information. The latter condition
implies that there must be evidence that all parties received the update and all parties
know whether there was unanimous agreement to it being applied to the information.
Figure 5(b) shows A proposing an update to the information shared by A, B and C.
Interceptors are used to mediate each organisation’s access to the information. In step
8
(a) Information sharing
Org. C
Org. B
Org.
A i
update
update
update
(b) Non-repudiable information sharing
2
Org.
A i
1 3
interceptor
Org. B
interceptor
Org. C
interceptor
2
Figure 5: Non-repudiable information sharing
1, A attempts an update to the information. A’s interceptor intercepts the update and, in
step 2, executes a non-repudiable state coordination protocol with B and C to achieve
the following:
1. That A’s update is irrefutably attributable to A and proposed to B and C.
2. That B and C independently validate A’s proposed update, using a locally deter-
mined and application-specific process, and their respective decisions are made
available to A and are irrefutably attributable to B and C.
3. That the collective decision on the validity of the update (in this case, responses
from B and C to A) are made available to all parties (A, B and C).
If the resolution of the protocol executed at step 2 represents agreement to the update
then the shared information is updated in step 3. Otherwise, the information remains
in the state prior to A’s proposed update. Non-repudiable connect and disconnect pro-
tocols govern changes to the membership of the group of organisations sharing the
information.
Our previous work on B2BObjects [5] presents a realisation of the above abstrac-
tion of regulated information sharing. The paper gives a detailed description of a non-
repudiable state coordination protocol used to reach agreement on update to shared
information that offers the liveness and safety guarantees discussed in Section 3.1. A
Java RMI-based implementation of B2BObjects is also described. This implementation
is the starting point for the component middleware support for regulated information
sharing described in Section 4.3.
As with non-repudiable service invocation, the use of interceptor’s allows us to
abstract away the details of state coordination and insulate the application from proto-
col specifics. From the application viewpoint, the update to shared information is an
atomic action that succeeds or fails dependent on the agreement of the parties sharing
the information. Thus the interceptors may execute any protocol that achieves non-
repudiable agreement on: the origin and state of a proposed update; the state of the
shared information after application of an update; and the membership of the group
that agreed to, or vetoed, the update.
9
3.4 Evidence generation requirements
To meet non-repudiation requirements the evidence generated, and signed, during ser-
vice invocation or update to shared information must be in a form that cannot be sub-
sequently disputed. For non-repudiable service invocation, the requirement is that a
meaningful snapshot of the invocation is signed and stored. An invocation has two
parts: (i) the request comprising the service invoked, identified by a globally resolv-
able name such as a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI), and any parameters to the
request, and (ii) the result of the invocation. For both the parameters to the invocation
and the result, there are three different types to consider.
1. value types, or references to local objects, must be resolved to an agreed repre-
sentation of their state at invocation (or at response for the result).
2. service references must be resolved to a meaningful, agreed representation of
the service such as a URI.
3. shared information must be resolved both to a representation of the state of
the information and a reference to the mechanism for sharing the information
that is resolvable by the remote party. The combination of this evidence allows
the remote party to determine the state of the shared information at invocation
time and also to access the shared information locally after the invocation has
completed.
For non-repudiable information sharing, the main requirements are: (i) that an agreed
representation of information state is stored; and (ii) that there can be no dispute that
a subsequent reconstruction of information state is a state previously agreed by the
organisations who share the information.
3.5 Infrastructure requirements
Trusted interceptors require the following underlying services:
• Cryptographic primitives [20]: a signature scheme such that signature sigA (x)
byA on data x is both verifiable and unforgeable; a secure (one-way and collision-
resistant) hash function; and a secure pseudo-random sequence generator to gen-
erate statistically random and unpredictable sequences of bits. Random numbers
are used to generate unique identifiers and random authenticators during non-
repudiation protocols.
• Credential (certificate) management: a service to support signature verification
that stores certificates and certificate revocation information, and can be used to
verify certificate chains.
• Time-stamping: non-repudiation evidence should be time-stamped for logging
and to support the assertion that the signature used to sign evidence was not
compromised at time of use [26]. Recently, forward-secure signature schemes
have been proposed that obviate the need for a third party signature on time-
stamps [25].
• Persistence: persistence services are required both to log non-repudiation evi-
dence and to store the state of invocation parameters/results and of shared infor-
mation. Non-repudiation evidence will include a signed secure digest of state
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that is held in a state store. Persistence services should support the mapping of
the state digest to the representation of state in the state store.
• Access control: to map credentials to roles between organisations. The exchange
of credentials at first connection to shared information or on service invocation
can be used as hooks to trigger the mapping of credentials to roles in a virtual en-
terprise. In this area, there is considerable existing work on credential exchange
[11, 24]. An approach that seems fruitful is Cambridge’s event-based access
control system [2] where roles are activated, based on credentials presented, and
de-activated in response to events in the system or changes in the environment.
• Membership service: for information sharing, the membership of the group that
shares information must be identified. It must also be possible to map mem-
ber identifiers (for example, URIs) to credentials in the credential management
service.
4 Component-based implementation
This section presents a component middleware implementation of the services de-
scribed in Section 3. The implementation is based on a J2EE application server.
J2EE applications are assembled from components (self-contained software units). The
components include Enterprise JavaBeans (EJBs) that are deployed on an application
server. EJBs run in an environment called an EJB container. Together, the server and
container provide a bean’s runtime environment. The container intercepts remote invo-
cations on the bean and is responsible for invoking appropriate low-level services, such
as persistence and transaction management, for each operation on the bean. The appli-
cation programmer concentrates on the functional (business logic) aspects of a bean’s
behaviour while the container provides services to ensure correct, non-functional be-
haviour.
Container
EJB Component
EJB
Client
Services
Non
Repudiation
Messaging
Persistence
Transaction
Management
Figure 6: J2EE-based component architecture with non-repudiation
Figure 6 shows an EJB client invoking an operation on an EJB component and the
container interception of the invocation to provide various services. As shown, the
intention is to add a non-repudiation service to regulate access to EJBs.
Our prototype extends the JBoss J2EE application server [8]. JBoss makes system-
atic use of reflection and invocation path interceptors to support extension to its existing
services and the addition of new services. This provides a straightforward mechanism
for the implementation of the trusted interceptors introduced in Section 3. Although
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this exploits JBoss-specific mechanisms, similar support is found in other component-
based systems (for example, the use of interceptors in the Jironde flexible transaction
framework [19]). Furthermore, even when the introduction of new interceptors is not
directly supported by a component system, the well-known smart proxy design pattern
[9] can be followed to introduce a layer between application clients and application
server components. An example of this approach is the use of smart proxies to support
on-line upgrades to component systems [17].
In JBoss, interceptors are used to invoke container-level services to meet require-
ments specified in a component’s deployment descriptor. An application-level invo-
cation passes through a chain of interceptors, each interceptor completing some task
before passing the invocation to the next interceptor in the chain. Existing services
can be modified or new services added to a container by inserting additional intercep-
tors in the chain. JBoss uses reflection to provide the interceptor with access to the
application-level method called, the method parameters, the target bean and its deploy-
ment descriptor. JBoss provides interceptors both at the server and the client (using a
dynamic proxy). Thus the mechanism supports the execution of additional logic at the
client-side on behalf of a container-level service.
The prototype implementation uses JBoss interceptors to access our non-repudiation
middleware that uses a generic B2BCoordinator service for the exchange of protocol
messages. Custom protocol handlers are registered with the coordinator to execute non-
repudiation protocols. The coordinator service also provides access to generic services
that support execution of protocols (such as credential management and state storage).
The combination of generic coordinator service and custom protocol handlers provides
a middleware that is adaptable to different application requirements, for example to
execute different protocols and to support the different interaction styles described in
Section 3.1.
The implementations are based on the direct trusted interceptor interaction shown
in Figure 3(c). Furthermore, no TTP is used to support protocol execution. Thus, the
implementation of service invocation guarantees safety and liveness if client and server
satisfy the trusted interceptor assumptions. The implementation of information sharing
guarantees: (i) no invalid changes to shared information whatever the behaviour of par-
ticipants, and (ii) liveness if all parties satisfy the trusted interceptor assumptions. The
flexibility inherent in our approach means that we can transform these implementations
by introducing a TTP to support execution of fault-tolerant fair exchange protocols of
the kind described in [7]. This transformation would then allow us to relax the strong
assumptions about the parties to the interaction.
4.1 B2BCoordinator service and protocol handlers
Each trusted interceptor provides a B2BCoordinator service for the exchange of mes-
sages with other trusted interceptors. In the J2EE implementation, this service is ex-
ported as a remote object that remote trusted interceptors make invocations on to de-
liver messages. This service is the external entry point for execution of non-repudiation
protocols. The interface is:
B2BCoordinatorRemote {
void deliver(B2BProtocolMessage msg);
B2BProtocolMessage deliverRequest(B2BProtocolMessage msg);
}
Remote invocation of deliver results in delivery of the given message (as a parameter
to the call) from the remote party. deliver can be used for synchronous or asyn-
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chronous protocol execution. deliverRequest is a convenience method that allows a
remote party to deliver a message and then to wait synchronously for a response (the
result of the call). A B2BProtocolMessage is an interface to information common to
non-repudiation protocol messages — request (protocol run) identifier, sender, protocol
step, signed content, payload etc. Concrete implementations of B2BProtocolMessage
meet protocol-specific requirements.
To execute specific protocols, and meet different application or platform require-
ments, custom protocol handlers are registered with the coordinator service. The co-
ordinator is responsible for mapping an incoming protocol message to an appropriate
handler. The coordinator also provides access to local services that are not protocol
or platform specific. All protocol handlers provide the following interface to the local
coordinator service to process incoming messages:
B2BProtocolHandler {
void process(B2BProtocolMessage msg);
B2BProtocolMessage processRequest(B2BProtocolMessage msg);
}
Protocol handlers use the coordinator service provided by remote parties to deliver out-
going protocol messages. As discussed below, for non-repudiable service invocation,
a B2BInvocationHandler initiates protocol execution by an appropriate protocol han-
dler. For non-repudiable information sharing, a B2BObjectController initiates protocol
execution.
4.2 Implementation of non-repudiable service invocation
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Client Proxy
Other JBoss
interceptors
JBoss NR
Interceptor
B2B Coordinators
Server
Other JBoss
Interceptors
JBoss NR
Interceptor
EJB Component
B2B Protocol
Handlers
Trusted Interceptor
B2B Invocation
Handlers
Container Services
Trusted Interceptor
EJB Client
Figure 7: JBoss/J2EE-based implementation of non-repudiable invocation
In J2EE, service invocation equates to the remote invocation of an operation on
an enterprise bean. As shown in Figure 7, the JBoss facility for server- and client-
side interceptors is used to render the operation non-repudiable. The client’s reference
to the remote bean is a dynamic proxy generated by the server. This proxy contains
client-side interceptors that are typically used for context propagation. We add an extra
interceptor — the JBoss NR interceptor — to both client and server invocation paths.
These NR interceptors are responsible for triggering execution of a non-repudiation
protocol that achieves the exchange described in Section 3.2. The client-side NR in-
terceptor accesses the client’s non-repudiation middleware that in turn manages the
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client’s participation in protocols and its access to supporting infrastructure to store
evidence etc.
Each interceptor in a chain may execute on both the outgoing and incoming invo-
cation path. To achieve non-repudiation of the request as constructed by the client and
to verify the integrity of the response presented to the client, the client-side NR inter-
ceptor is the first in the chain on the outgoing path (and last on the return path). On the
server-side, to verify the integrity of the request as it entered the server and to provide
non-repudiation of the response as it leaves the server, the NR interceptor is the first in
the chain on the incoming path (the last on the return path).
Each JBoss interceptor has an invoke operation that takes an Invocation object1 as
a parameter for the interceptor to process in some way. The interceptor then passes
the Invocation to the next interceptor in the chain by calling that interceptor’s invoke
operation. The invoke operation of the client-side JBoss NR interceptor is:
public Object invoke(Invocation inv) {
B2BInvocationHandler b2bInvHdlr =
B2BInvocationHandler.getInstance(“JBossJ2EE”, “direct”);
B2BInvocation b2bInv =
new JBossB2BInvocation(nextInterceptor(), inv);
return b2bInvHdlr.invoke(b2bInv);
}
getInstance is a factory method that returns a reference to a B2BInvocationHandler
for the given platform (“JBossJ2EE”) to execute the given protocol (“direct”). The
concrete implementation of a B2BInvocationHandler is under control of the client.
A B2BInvocation object is a generic wrapper for platform-specific representations of
the service to invoke and the invocation parameter(s). For a JBossB2BInvocation, the
service to invoke is the next interceptor in the chain and a JBoss Invocation object
encapsulates the invocation parameters. When invoke is called, the general behaviour
of the client-side B2BInvocationHandler is:
1. obtain a reference to or instantiate the local B2BCoordinator service;
2. obtain a reference to or instantiate a protocol handler for the given protocol and
register the handler with the coordinator service;
3. request that the protocol handler execute its non-repudiation protocol using the
given service and invocation parameters; and
4. return the outcome of protocol execution (normally the server’s response) to the
client.
To start execution of the protocol, the client-side B2BInvocationHandler replaces the
arguments to the service invocation with the first message of the protocol and a ref-
erence to its local coordinator service. These are then passed up through the inter-
ceptor chain to the server. When the server-side NR interceptor receives the Invo-
cation object, it instantiates a JBoss-specific B2BInvocationHandler object and calls
the B2BInvocationHandler’s invoke method with the Invocation object as a parameter.
The general behaviour of the server-side B2BinvocationHandler is:
1. obtain a reference to or instantiate the local B2BCoordinator service;
1an encapsulation of the client’s service invocation, include contextual information and related payload
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2. obtain a reference to or instantiate a protocol handler for the type of B2BProtocol-
Message encapsulated in the Invocation object and register the handler with the
coordinator service; and
3. request that the protocol handler execute its non-repudiation protocol using the
protocol message and remote coordinator reference (obtained from the Invoca-
tion object).
At the appropriate point during execution of the non-repudiation protocol, the client’s
request is actually passed through the interceptor chain to the EJB component for ex-
ecution. The result of this execution is then used to complete the non-repudiation
protocol.
The application programmer on the server side is responsible for identifying, in a
bean’s deployment descriptor, when non-repudiation is required and for identifying the
platform and protocol for instantiation of the B2BInvocationHandler by the NR inter-
ceptor. Thus the server controls activation of non-repudiation. However, the client
controls its own participation, through its own implementations of B2BInvocation-
Handler, B2BProtocolHandler and B2BCoordinator. Thus, for example, the client may
change the behaviour of its B2BInvocationHandler to attempt to re-negotiate the non-
repudiation protocol to execute. As shown, the NR interceptor, B2BInvocationHandler,
B2BProtocolHandler and B2BCoordinator comprise each party’s trusted interceptor.
4.3 Implementation of non-repudiable information sharing
The implementation of non-repudiable information sharing is based on our previous
work on B2BObjects. This provides the abstraction of shared information depicted
in Figure 5(b) by coordinating the state of local (object) replicas that encapsulate the
information. Figure 8 illustrates the component-based implementation when two or-
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B2BObject
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Figure 8: JBoss/J2EE-based implementation of non-repudiable information sharing
ganisations, A and B, share a B2BObject and A is updating the object state. As in
a standard J2EE application, an EJB client makes invocations through an application
interface (a session bean) that may result in access and update to an associated en-
tity bean. In this case, the entity bean has been identified as a B2BObject that should
be coordinated with remote replicas. An interceptor traps invocations on the entity
bean to ensure that a B2BobjectController controls access and update to the bean. The
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controller is the local interface to configuration, initiation and control of information
sharing. It uses protocol handlers and a coordinator service to execute non-repudiable
state and membership coordination protocols with remote parties. Implementations of
the interceptor, controller, protocol handlers and coordinator are all provided by the
middleware, as is the supporting infrastructure to store evidence etc. The controller
uses application-specific validation listeners to validate state and membership changes
proposed by remote parties. Figure 8 shows B’s controller validating A’s proposed up-
date by appealing to one or more state validators (implemented as session beans). The
update is only applied to the replicas if B agrees to the proposal. The process is the
same for an update proposed by B. Furthermore, the implementation supports sharing
by more than two parties.
The middleware-provided JBoss interceptor is responsible for interaction with the
B2BobjectController, and, through the controller, the B2Bobjects middleware. The ap-
plication programmer is responsible for: identifying an entity bean as a B2BObject;
providing configuration information in the bean’s deployment descriptor (for example,
to identify validator beans); and providing implementations of one or more session
beans to perform validation. Optionally, the application programmer may specify that
a method in the application interface should result in a series of operations on an un-
derlying B2BObject bean being “rolled-up” into a single coordination event. The en-
hancement of an entity bean to become a B2BObject is effectively transparent to the
local EJB client and its application interface.
5 Related work
We are not aware of other work that provides systematic integration of services for
trusted interaction with component middleware. There is a Web Services non-repudiation
proposal [10] that specifies a mechanism to request and send a signed receipt for a
SOAP (XML-encoded) message in order to support so-called “voluntary” non-repudiation.
The OASIS Digital Signature Service [18] proposes XML request/response protocols
for signing, verifying and time-stamping data. The Universal Postal Union has pro-
posed the Global Electronic Postmark [22] (EPM) standard. This is a TTP service for
generation, verification, time-stamping and storage of non-repudiation evidence. The
service would also support linking of evidence under a unique transaction identifier
to allow business transaction events to be bound together. None of these proposals
provide for the exchange of non-repudiation evidence or the governance of complex
interactions. These would have to be delivered at the application level with the pro-
posed services used as back-end infrastructure (which in the case of EPM would be
provided by a TTP).
Early work by Clark and Wilson [4] on security policy stressed the importance
of data integrity in the commerce domain (as opposed to the military domain’s focus
on disclosure). In the Clark-Wilson model constrained data items are only manipu-
lated through verified transformation procedures as part of well-formed transactions.
This ensures that transformations respect an organisation’s integrity rules, for exam-
ple respecting good accounting practice, and are logged for audit. The model was
concerned with enforcement of policy within organisations. The use of verified trans-
formation procedures that mediate the actions within an organisation is similar to the
use of trusted interceptors as mediators between organisations.
There has been much recent work on fair exchange and fair non-repudiation, and
on the formal verification of protocols. Kremer et al [12] summarise the state of the art
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and provide a useful classification of protocols according to types of fairness and the
role of TTPs in protocols. There have also been contributions on the transformation
of fair exchange [13, 7] to meet fault tolerance requirements. This body of work can
be brought to bear on the choice of protocols that trusted interceptors execute to meet
interaction requirements.
The work of Minsky et al on Law Governed Interaction (LGI) [15] represents one
of the earliest attempts to provide coordination between autonomous organisations.
Trusted agents act as mediators that comply with a global policy. This is similar to the
trusted interceptor abstraction in that the interaction between agents is assumed to be
legal. LGI does not address systematic non-repudiation.
Wichert et al [23] used filters in CORBA to provide non-repudiable invocation on
a remote object. However, there approach is asymmetric — the client provides the
server with non-repudiation of origin of a request but there is no exchange to provide
corresponding evidence to the client. Their work did provide useful insights into repre-
sentation of evidence in XML documents. In our system the exact representation of ev-
idence is a matter for agreement between parties concerned, the important requirement
is that the representation can be subsequently rendered meaningful and irrefutable.
6 Conclusions and future work
This paper presented a unified approach to regulated interaction based on the abstrac-
tion of trusted interceptors that mediate interactions. The component-based middle-
ware implementation provides the basic building blocks for the construction of a com-
posite service by organisations collaborating to form a virtual enterprise. This can
be extended to support transactional interaction. Our preliminary work in this area [6]
shows how B2BObjects can participate in distributed (JTA [3]) transactions. We intend
to build on this work to provide component-based transactional and non-repudiable in-
teraction.
In effect, the trusted interceptor abstraction, and its realisation in middleware, pro-
vides a flexible framework for implementation of different approaches to non-repudiable
service invocation (fair exchange) and regulated information sharing. Future work will
use this framework to provide a suite of protocols and other mechanisms that can be
deployed to meet different application requirements.
We intend to integrate the underlying mechanisms presented here with work on
run-time monitoring of contracts [16]. Contracts are represented as executable finite
state machines that can be verified using model-checking tools. We will, for exam-
ple, use implementations of the verified state machines to validate changes to shared
information for contract compliance.
We also intend to investigate the use of Aspect Oriented Programming to allow the
declaration of non-repudiation as a non-functional aspect of a service that results in
support to exchange non-repudiation evidence etc.
Another area of work is the deployment of the middleware presented to render Web
Service interactions non-repudiable.
Finally, we are not aware of systematic work on the performance costs of non-
repudiation services (as opposed to the relative performance of cryptographic algo-
rithms). There are a number of aspects to non-repudiation that impact on performance,
including the computational overhead of cryptographic algorithms; the space overhead
of evidence generated and the communication overhead of additional messages to ex-
ecute protocols. Our interceptor-based framework will allow us to compare different
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implementations and their impact on performance.
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